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"TBE FUTURE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS" 
by 
Major General J. Strom 'Ihurmond, USAR 
In ey comments today I shall cover several aspects of Civil Affairs 
operations to i nclude some of th~ current developments. I will discuss first 
the future role of Civil Affairs in combat; mention briefly Civil Af:f'aJ.rs in 
the cold war; in<U.ca.tfJ our interest in Civil ~:t'e.nse; ar.c., I 11ope, point out 
to you that the military-civil relati onship t iuict ion (i .e. , Civil Affairs) is 
of such importance as to wa.rra..'lt proper reeognition on a co!'ml,9,nder' s staff e 
First, let me remind you that the term. "Civil Affairs" shoul(l be '1<-~:f'im~d. 
and understood to embrace the enti re range of rela.tions:ups betwe~n a military 
force and the governmeµt administrative officials and tee general public of 
:f'riewily and enemy areas affected. by the prese:a.ce and operations of.' s1.1ch forca. 
It is indeed u."lfortu.TJ.ate that some people persist in the erro:c.eous belief that 
Civ:T.1 .Ai'fairs is merely a st~ar.eoated term now used. to ic'ientify 'militar~· 
goY<::..i....::. · ·:1:V , 0 :tn other words only p:i:.•epa.rati on for the exercising of legislatiVe., 
judicial, and executive powers over an oceupied area after the war ha.a pasae~ 
on. 
Whatever the mission of en armed force , t:1.e pro:pe:-c discli.arge of Civil 
Mfairs operations in suwort thereof is usu.ally vital if the accomplishment of 
t:!:J.a.t mission is to produce optinum benefi t to our national in'Gercsts0 
The nature, seope, !f.'ao"'Tl.itude, and comple:dty cf Civil Mfa.irs re,:;.,uires 
close General Sta.i'f coo:r.-dina:l;ion for :max5.mum res1.,,J:l;s. Its importance in 
compa.riso..-i to other aspects of en operation will va....ry within wide limits, 
d~pending on the nature of the assie,r.ned mission and ·i:;h~ politicsl,· ~conomic, and 
psychological condltions tt.'1.c1.ei· which this mission mt.mt be executed. We.en we 
consider these conditions, we realize that the occasion will be rare, indeed, 
when Civil Affairs considerations may be completely igcored, even for a lindted 
time, on the theory that they f'a.il to bear on the combs.t mission. Mi the; other 
end of the speetrum there may be tiI!les when the whole \!B,l!l:paign becomes virtually 
a Civil Affairs operation. 'lh..1s was the case in Lebanon in 1958. Doctrine, 
training, staff' organization, force composition, opero;bions pl.a.."'l.s 1 anc. 
operational prcceduxes must recognize these facts and be so sound, comprehensive 
and flexible as i;o meet the requirements of aJJ.y of these situations in timely 
fashion. We must never forge·b that, other things beir.g eq_ual, timing becoml~G 
t:.1.e essential factor in operational success. And - til!ling c1_e!!J.a.."1ds not only 
the presence of the nec!essary means but also fa.cili t_y: i:t the u~e of t !1ese mea.'Yls. 
'.I.he key to proper evaluation, pla:nnin.3 a.'l.'.l.d e:icecut:i.on of Civ.l.1 /!f'fo.irs 
operations lies in the l)or,j_tion and functions o:f' t:C.e Civil fii'i'a.irs element ot 
the staff' with respect to ·the other elements o-J: the staf:l. La.rg r tird.ts or 
task forces anc. l.a.rge co1'llllB.ncls require a G-5 or co.«an.e~'lsm·a.te c.~::~eral Sta.f'f' type 
entity in a joint or co.mbin~d headquarters. The Civil .Aftairr, staff e:l~rnero.t 
has a coordina~dng function. Fo:r e..~w.1ple, it includes t2~ General Sta.ff 
direction an& coord..ina.tion of sue~ activities as public ilrl'o:rwation and 
p:,ychological opt;::ra.tions d.ir~ctea. at the civil gov~l'!.'1.:1.e;ut ano. po:I?ula.tia:n in i;~,~ 
ar,.a of opcrationso Slria.11 te..ctica.1 ml.it staff's may not r~qt!ir~ a sp,-:l<:ia.lJ y 
cl.ccigna.tea. C:f.v-ll Affairs ste.ff section, because th~ Col!llna:r.1der, with tc.l'.:! h.t::lp 
of his JTocecutivc Off'icar, can sea that the Civil M-Zairs respo:c,.s:1.bili·f;icG of 
tho various staf'i' elements are properly pla.n..'tlt?d, coo?di:1.a.teo., an:: execut.ed in 
-c:.:.e combP-.t zcme, and sine"" a. ivil Af'fairs unit will d.ou.btless b e p2·ovid.b.g 
d..i.rect support g 
he ColUlll..9.Il~er w:t.11 moclify staff organization and will assign ft~~ctio;~s t0 
fi.t t~1"" I!lission and th. eirtut1s ,ancc:3 of lia opera.tio:c.o In zituatio:-:1s wh.'.. •!h 
ne:ceosarily emphasize Civil _!.f:Z'a.irs ±·unctions, t·._e small uri.it l!omma.nder 1!}.l.1-:l 
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create an S-5 Section, using such personnel as he r!JJ3.Y find available a:t the tilll:l. 
If he is fortunate, he will receive a trained augme:o.ta.tion. Otherwise, he way 
temporarily shift staff duties to accommodate to t!1e s:l.tu.ation at hand. :Cn 
operations which are fundamentally Civil .Affairs in natu.'!'e, th- Chief of' Sta:fi' 
or a. Deputy of a ls.rg~ unit ox force may function a"' t~e principal C:1.vil A:E';f'a.irs 
advisor. In suc:'l a cs.sa the G-5 would become the lea.di:ng sJca.f:f' planner just 
as G-3 does in a cOIO.ba.t situation. The point 1.s that, in ouch a. situation, a 
principal function of e,rery staff' section becon:tes support; of the Civil Affairs 
mission. I repeat - the G-5 rather than the G- 3 has t:!i1~ lea.di:ci.g role in 
operational planning in such circumstances. 
An efficient and effective mechanism :('or .liaison with U.S. and allied 
diplOJ:11.a.tic agencies and l.ocal gov~rnmenta.l agencies is r:eqt1i:t·f.!d, for optimum 
exet~utio:1 of Civil Affairs operations. In operations wbic~ a.re predor:dna.tely 
Civil Aff'a.irs in n.ature, as in Lebanon, the este.blismr.ent of a strong milita.ry­
civi.114~ 1iai,3on group is esoential. Its size, func't;io:11a, orga...,.iza.tion, and 
procedures will vary accordiw;;; to th~ nat~e, scope, l'lle~,":!!itue:a e.na. complexity of 
the Civil Affairs mission to be p~rfo:rmed. If time p~rtlts, a~ alter~ativ~ 
operational plan would be prepared to 111e t the sort of cont!ri..{~e:1.c:y wh.ic1! aror.:1.-:? 
in I&banon. SU.ch a. plan woulo. presc:dbe the size and fu:.'l.c:tiol:!s of t:'.1.r~ liaison 
g;-roup. 
Although many C-l'lrll M::airs duties require tec:h..'11:iea.lly tra.i!!ei speda1:Lsts., 
t he ability to db.·<:? t an.d supervise C;i.v.il Affairs ope:c"a:bio:2.s i n all situations 
:i.s a. requirement for all cOl!OOJ.a.nders and ehie:f's of staff. our officer tr.s.ir..:t.:r,.g 
r.~101.i.J..d reflect t his fact. Programs of i nstruetion of ~l!!Y and joint St!~ools 
shm:'.ld develop th:i.s ability to the o.eg:t··~!= a.nd in thl:! a.spec-ts appropriate to 
its eouxses and levels of inst:i:·uction. STRAC :has p:. n~1,n'eli in t:bi s :r'ield. of' 
training. I trust tha.t oux· service sch.ools a.re maki:n_g good use o! STRAG ' s i'i.t<:lr::~· 
c:1:ercise-test~~ procedti.res. 
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'Ille numbers and types of Civil Affairs units required for the conduct of 
operations will vary according to the mission of the cor,nna.nd and the circumstances 
in which it must be carried out. The Civi~ Affairs unit reqm,rement in war will 
be fairly uniform, and is reflected in the COI!tP9Sition of our mobilization troop 
base, which is of course subject to mod~fication in light of the circUJ.llstances 
of specific operations but which furnishes a planning guide ~t higher levels of 
command,. In operations short of war a greater Civil Affairs stre,ngth may be 
inclucled in the initial troop list. In some non..combat situations, Civil 
Affairs units may not be reqi;u.red> ~owever, the Civil Af'fairs fu..~etions will 
still be present and the commander wi],l look to his staff for support in band.ling 
theTI. Staff officers of senior coilll11i9,nds should have, for t~eiF use in planning, 
sev~ral combinations of type Civil Affairs tµ,iits wnich would serve as guides 
for planning operations under these varyipg sit~tions~ 
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We all agree that corps, divisipn, and even smaller units, in any future 
war must be capable of operating with substantial gaps between t~em on a 
battlefield of ever-increasing width and depth. We also agree that this war may 
well be fought against an enemy capable of emplpy:J.:qg nuclear weapons of 
unlimited size, CBR warfare, employing ~irborne and airla...1ded troops, 
infiltrators and guerri,ila.s. T'tlerefore~ all combat organizations must be abl~ 
to maintain an all-around defense and t9 establish defensive areas in great 
depth9 In order for tactical units successfully to accomplish any assigned 
mission under these adverse conditions, adequate Civil A:f:f'a.irs support will 
be absolutely essential. Let me assur~ you that Civil Affairs support goes 
far beyond the control of refugees and the discha,rge of occupation duties. 
In fact, this Civil Af'fairs su~port falls into nineteen broa~ fi~lds~ 
SLIDE l ON 
Illustrative of this Civil Affairs suppo~t, let me comment briefly on a 
few of what I consider the most im~oftant fields duri;ng combat situations: 
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SLIDE 1 OFF AND SLIDE 2 ON (STRIP) 
DISPLACED PERSONS - Civilians in a future~ of any ~nitude wiil su:f'ter 
hardships and create problems of a ma.gp.itude never known before. As an example, 
even though the Korean War was considered a luµ.te~ one, iy was demonstrated 
there that rei"ugees, when left unchecked, clog ma.in su~ply routes, interfere 
with the movements of troops; they inter~er~ wit~ t~, eijtablishment of 
defensive positions, and in addition create security risks. Preventing sueh 
situations and han.dling them if they do develop!~ not an enti~ely impossible 
task it it is done by weµ integrated Civil Af,;a'j,ps uµ.its and staf'f sections, 
These people a.re trained to carry out t~e co~e~·~ responsibilities under the 
terms or international law or agreements for t:P,e c,ontroJ,. of re:f'\1gees and 
displaced persons. Under Ciyil Affairs ~upertj.sion, s~ch ,persons may be gotten 
off the roads, out ot strategic areas a~d m9~t imp0rtant, where possible, out 
of the zone ot responsibility ot the combat comman~r. Let no one deeeive 
himselt by brushing this off 1:1,ghtly as just anoth~r MP job. The Military 
Police can and should make a magnificent contripution especially in the torward 
• I . . 
areas, but let tne:re be no mistake. ~if,'! is , Civ;i.l JU'fairs job t9 be hand.led 
by Civil Af"fairs people in sueh a way a~ tp free the ~litary forees for the 
military job. 
LABOR - Civil Affairs units a.re ~nstrUJlle~tal in the provisio~ ot oiv;ilian 
labor as requ:f,.red by ~he military -- po~&iqly th~ next most important support 
role. Building, repairing, and maintaining highwa,y, railroads and airfields 
have been tremendous tasks in the, past ~d w;l.J,l be an even greater one in the 
future. So will the handling ot enormous ~pPJr.U3,ges of: ~upplies, keeping 
vehieles and locomotives rolling and r~pa:f,ring qth;+ equip;i:qent. The$e are but 
a few ot the tasks that civilian l~bor can accompi~s~ for th~ oommander and 
thus perl1J:it him to better utilize his o~erat~o:p.al for~es for fighti~. At least, 
he ean if he has trained Civil Affairs personnel to assis~ him in loeati~, 
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obtaining, and maintaining this labor forc:e under proper a.nd uni!orm labor 
policies - available to his engineers when, where and as needed. 
PUBLIC SAFEfi ... Public Safety Funct;i.ons are imp.ortant to the combat 
co:mma.nder . Civil Affairs t~a.ms establish, or reestablish~ auxilia..rY civilian 
police, t own patrols, circulation l imit s , a.nd curf'ews to keep order . Civilian 
check~points are established. Proclamations and ordinances are posted to 
1nf'o:rm the publi c of what is EJCpeeted of them,. Military units will rarely 
have to be diverted t o those purp,oses when Civil Affa irs is on the job . 
PUBLIC HEALTH - Public Health funct i ons go beyond those items we think 
of as normally falling into this :('ield. Civil A:f'f'airs pe,rsormel concern 
them.selves with measures to preserve or r estore the state of publie health, 
thus protecting the health of' our own troops . Due to th~ destructiveness of 
.modern war, the provisions Qt the Gene~ Civilian Convention of 1949 require 
belligerents to protect the civilians . Prov·;J.sions fo:i; th~ protection of food 
and water supplies must be ta.ken--and, with the added problem of tall.out, this 
has become a tremendous task . We must make provisions for the treat~nt ot 
the wounded and siek. How will an insigniti~ant pumber of small teams aceomplish 
this? 1hey do it by the promulgation of loeal orders, directing that civilians 
obs~rve neeessa:ry medical a.nd sanitation measures, and by supervising or working 
with civilian public health off'ieials in the enf'oree?nent or theije ·orders and in 
the pert'orma.nae ot other publio health services, thus keeping the load off ot 
the military medical units . 
SLIDE 2 OFF .. 
One can go on and on. Civil A:ff'a:l,rs units will assist in resto:ping 
eommunications, obtaining housing for troops, locatilll!J stone quarries, sawmills, 
~d building materials . Inro:l'lna.tion ;media mu.st be alerted to keep the civilian 
population informed of e1vi1 detense measures and of the policies and purpos~s 
of the U. S. effort . Tile preservation of arts, monuments, and archives; insuring 
civilian supply, public transportation, and publie utilities at a IP1.nimum 
essential level; in short, public well'are generally e~ot re,:nai,n a matter ot 
unconcern to the military commander if he is to ~stab,li~h ~d Jl'IB.).ntai:n an 
optimUlll environment for the fig~tin~ of his b~t~les~ '.lhese mo~um~~taf ~as~s 
cannot be aeeomplished, however, witl,l untrained perso~el, st~f.s, ang. units. 
What's more, the rest of our military orga.nii~t.:top. lilUst bee0me ~rcus,P~d to · 
working with ~d considering tl,lem. 
The bati(;letield of the future a.nd its ef?.vP,o~~nt a+~ D10St diffieult to 
envision and even more dif':('ieult objeet;i,,vely i;.o d~f,1~e. In ~::f,,ous EJtud,ies 
and staff papers whieh have evolved ot recent y~~, ~f ~ver~eµt eo~clµsions 
have been reached. Some would have us '.Jilif,rtw.e 1;11.~ t'ut:ure Q~ti;;tet'~eld with an 
administrative support b~.~e e.nd a wide ~p~sl! of llPltF:rl~d. 1;>etwe~n1 that ba.se 
1 
and t he eonit,>~t elements. Ot~ers would lw,v~ ~~ ~~~~:ure it as a ~4 witn 
f ingers--lines ot eommunication--stretohing off ~h,v~ t~~ hi~ter~a.nd with 
the tips of the finge~s in ~ontaet with the ene,py. 
No one has suggested that the future battlefiel~ wili be tµa.t ~a+row zone 
between belligerents in whie~ the fi~h~i~ of p;i.s~ WJJW$ ~~ l~n p~aqe. 
I n reality, no one rea.Uy knows what thl;I,~ fµt)lJ;', ba:~tlef;Lel.q. w:lll 'be like, 
and tor the pu;rpose of our discussion today, i~ iij 9t no great importance. 
Because, irrespective of the sbape of that b~ttlefieid, t~~re w~ll 9e ~ore 
civilians on it, more destruction, more dep1~~nce 9y thope ~ivi~i~s o~ the 
military and for that matte~, more de;pend.e,p.oe 'bf tbe ~.}r;i:tary on the ~ivili!µl 
t han bas ev~r been true before. 
Tb.is all adds up to the tact that the eo~~e,r ~~ ~he 1ie+4, who is held 
, I , 
r esponsibl~ tor the conduct ot the battie, m~pt 13r+so be ~~s~pn~i~le tor Civil 
A!'tairs operations. 
I have outlined for you som,e ot the f'4Il~tious of Civi~ Att~irs. 'lhe 
question is--how will these function~ be impl~me~~edf 
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In looking to the future as it may pe a,ftect,d py 1:lle gre13,t unknown, 
nuclear warfare, t he f'unetion ot the Civil ~ffai~~ s~aff otf'ieer ( t he ,Assistant 
Chief of Sta.tt, q-5) and the mission of the Civil ,Attau:~ .wait pro~:a.bl y w+i l 
remain subst{l.Iltially unchanged. The~r prQb+e~, P,QW~er, will 't;>e magnified in 
proportion to the intensity of the n~c+ear ex~h.a.m$e. 
The new element introduce(}., however, ;i.i:;1 the V~$'1ii ~-,r JPt h~ 9~:l.ngs 
I 
l ikely to be attected. This eleme:r;it, in itself, wi,.U de~.d ~,h~ ,deye.;l.opm,nt 
and t raini:p.g of the most et:ficient ~v~J. At:i;'a.;L;r,f;I o,rg~jzatJ. .AA :i.lb;i,;l;l q~ pe 
devised. Here, I wouJ.d like to poin;t; ol,lt 't~t Jll()+'' ~}'l® ,tl}..e dev~lo]?me:g.t and 
training of Civil Affairs un~ts is ~eeess~y. ~ere~~ a need for Civil Ai"tairs 
staff members at all ech~loµs of c~~ ~9 1~~91", o~~;i.mµJ,n em~ioyme~t of such 
units and in their absence to assi$t th~ co~~de~ to in~ure t}l,at a~q~~t~ 
attention is paid to that muJ.titude or O~vi~ ,Atf~irs l1lf4.t,t~s v~tp~ wi.J,l 
either impede or f acilitate his operatio~s, i~ it~ect proppr~io~ ~o the ~f fort 
expe:nded v.pon them. Who is to say what wo'l\Ld, ~ve ¥p~eµei;I. d.p. ~ssia in WOll'l<\ 
War I I had the Germans observed prol'<'r Ci~il Mt~ir~ ~rt~oip~~P ~tining their 
campaigns, in the UKRAINE? It is impo~tant, to9, tlµi~ othe~ ~t~tt ~~rsq;qnel 
become familiar with this Civil Affairs ~t~t' tµn,t,:t.op. ~d p, a,,ycn1st01µed to 
dealing with a G-5 sta.tf element on sue~ probl~ms. 
Some of the proposed means for meettng thie fequ1rement are: 
a. To include G-5 staff .seetio~~ an4 ~ J?rope;r +Bil?;lo q'f O:l,vil J.±, a~rs 
units i n all force struct~es. 
b. To give due consideration to C~vi; Af'~A~~~ ~ap~bilitie~ in the 
preparation of a.11 contingency planij~ ~o ;Lt1.1=1ure 'tbaj; ~p.es~ pl~s ma,k;e adeq~te 
pr ovision for Civil Atfa;i.rs suppo~i. 
Affairs principles. 
d. To insure tha:ti the operati~ ~tUJ:1~ of t;:j,.vj,,t 4tta;tr~, ??-pt just 
the adm:imstrative or military govern,m~~t ]?ha.~,~ is ~~;lerte~ tp.roughput 
military doctrine. 
e. To maintain a elose working relationship betwee~ the Department 
of Defense and the other governmental ~en~ies coµcerned with our national 
policy. 
Now, what are sane other new developments ot importance to Civil Mfairs 
with whieh we should be familiar? One develo~nt; has to do "'1th serious re­
examination of Civil At:rairs doctrine, The De~tl)lent o'! th~ 4,:Tp.y, USCONARC, 
and the service schools are constantly revie1;ing doetripe a.nq. ~earel:J.ipg tor 
ways to improve it and the techniques invqlved in C!vi~ Aff~!rs -0perations. 
Doctrine and techniques of operation must fit thf p~w con9epts 9f hpt war a~d, 
equally iµlportant, the current concept of ~~ace. 
I should also like to invite your attent;toA to a stuw in ~rogi,~ss whie~ 
should help us to place the f"uture in :i;>erspeej;;1,v.e a,s we r~t:j.n~ qtµ' techniques 
ot operation and doctrine. The study i~ ope undeh ~on~r~et wit4 t~~ Operations 
Research Office (ORO) of' Johns Hopkins qntve~sity. It ~s 9~e~ Ul'lder preparatio~ 
for three years and is entitled "Opt:l.;n:i~ PAMG O:r~aAAza.t;l.on a,ni. Functionipg after, 
196o" (u). This study considers ~he Civil At'fai;t-e a.sper;ts of cold as vell as 
hot war • 
. Another development has to do with the r,ole o+ C;i.vil fif!a:i,rs ~n m~eting the 
threats o! Communist subversion in unq.e;r-t;lev~pe<l, fpiendly ~ountries. '!be cold 
war is presenting Civil Att'ai+'s with n~ challeJ:ige~, J10t oJ'l'.).y in $out4east Asia. 
but in this he~sphere as well. ~e e~~tsts ~eli~ve tba,~ ~he ~der-develop~~, 
I ' 
have-not, countries represent the Achill~s hee~ 0! ,~~ fi'r~e Wonlq. 
'):he most dangerous form o! Connnunist agr~~ij~cn in t~e PP~~ War ~s a Fift~ 
Column constituted internally as a ioeal Co~i~t P®"~Y Pr ~fe~na+J,y PY 
nationals who make up the nucleus of tpe Pt:1,rtf to oe ~onneq ~~ ~sed when the 
occasion arises. 'lllis organization ts the~~· 'll1,e i:18.l:'get of thia enemy ~s 
the people. 
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They are the real stakes in the cold war. Al,though Southeast Asia has only .S~ 
per cent 01" the world's total area, it has 66o million peop,1.e, abol.lt 9Il~-fourtb 
01" the world's population. 
A cold-war operational doctrine has evolve~ ~ng thep~ s~ ~tiq~s wh1,~A 
' 
o1"1"ers considerable prospect of success. Tb.is doctrine is based ~pop the use 
01" the nations' armed 1"orces as a civic sup:i;>ort ageney. Sometimes the m;µ1tary 
forms the only dynamic and cohesive 1"oree tor preservµ:i.g sovereignty in a 
country and is the most stable eleme~t 01" the govenuzient. Its ;units are 
stationed throut;hout the country with u,n~forms tb,at el~arly id.en:titl its ~emb.,1;121 
as government people. The military COlllJ?l.~ieation net may be the only rea.µy 
e1"1"ieient communications system in ~he eowtry. '!'he 4,rmed Forees ~y ~e the 
only agency upon which the government ean plAce 1"u.l1 relia.n.ee. lb.us, the 
national sovereign ot necessity turns to the arJ!led t'o!t'ees 1"or ne:t;:f,qnc\l duties 
tar beyond the traditional role of the milit~I' !neir lIJS.in PllJ:'llO~e ~~~.).~ 
with army-people relationship tor winntp.g the!~ support ot the ep',1Pt;ry-si4, 
for the armed forces and thus tor the ~overnment. Civil A:t."!airs activities 
become a primary weapon in this war to convince the people that their ul.timat~ 
salvation lies with the non-communist world. 
One method employed in Southeast Asia tor :t.mproving the civilian-military 
relations tor which we have great hol?e is what we call ncivie Action." Civic 
Action is a project 01" a selt'~help ~ture tmdertaken by arJ]led to~ces, 1~ 
conjtmction with the local. popul.ation, for the benetit and weµ-be+ne; qt 
civilians or civilian colD!ll.u.nities , generally in 1"ields of p~lio wella.IT~, 
public works, public health, educ~t~q~, ,m4 ot~e~ sue~ l;U'eas ~f QiVtlia.µ eQn~e~A• 
A number ot countries where we have Military As~ist1;µ1ce Advts9~y Groµi~ a.+e 
conducting some activities in the civic action f~eid. TM,.s to~ovs clpsely 
suggestions made by the Draper Committee which recently com~let~d ~ exhaustive 
survey 01" our military aid program. 
10 
A new DOD Directive states: nMilitary assistance programs should, where 
:f'ea.sible, encourage the use of indigenous military and para-military forces 
in under-developed countries in the construction o! public works a.nd other 
activities helptu.1 to eeono:mie development, provided th.at such participation. 
does not significantly d.etraet from the capability ot the :f'orees to per:f'orm 
essential milita.ry missions. 11 
Mueh needs to be accomplished to integrate a.:n. e~tective Civil M:f'atrs 
operation into the t otal indigenous military ef'tort. An indigenous Civil 
Mtairs capability is required. Th.e developmentot this ea.pabi]..ity ts 
:f'acilitated by Civil .At:f'a.irs advisors in the MAAG; by U.S • .Axmy Mobile Civil 
Mf'a.irs traini11g teams an~ by ottering training for :f'oreig~ otf'ieera at t)le 
U.S. Army Civll Affairs School. 
The development o:f' Civil A..~airs tecbni~ues in the Cold War is a two-way 
street. 
We are learning much ~rom the Southeast Asia..~ otticers. Their ~dea.s on 
the role Civil Atrairs plays in their national security a~e realistieally 
based upon ne~essity. It hs.1.:t of the United States wer~ occupied by the enell!V 
and the people in the re:!lla.ini ~g halt' were not tully coI!t'i&~nt of tAe ability 
ot our governme.2.t, we wouJ.d be j·ast a.s reaJ.istic. '1!a.e U.S• .Arm:y Civil At'tairs 
School presently teaches the e'...eir-:lopment of a good 'basic Civil Mtairs 
eapability which is moat "UZG:.'\!J.l in operations in a. hot war. '.f.1-,..is was the 
mission o~ the sehool when or~ilmlly established. Within this lim;tt some 
recognition is given to the Cold War aspects of Civil Attairs. ~owever, 
this is not sutficient to ~~t the increasi ng requirements to train tore!~ 
ottieers and the MAAG adv!so~s t or the areas where the war is being pre~sed 
by our Communist enemy. Tb.1e d.eil!la.!ld is not limited to Southeast Asi~. South 
America. is an area of similar concern. Our courses at the School ~'llS~ 'tl~ 
rev;i.sed to meet this reqci.reme:ut or a new course must be developed !or the 
purpose. 
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A third and last development which I shoul.d like to discuss today, altho~h 
by no means the least, bas to do with Civil Defense. 
Recently General Lemnitzer, Chairman ot the Joint Chiets ot Statt, indieat~d 
that "!ast moving events ot current history are bringing into clear to~~.fil the 
inter-relationship between civil defense and military strength--both ot which 
are essential elements ot our national security posture." He turther indicate~ 
that the Arm::! is ready and able, not only to assist in civil detense should 
that become ne¢esaa.ry, but to plan now concerning the tor.m s~ch assistance should 
take. He believes that the benef':i.ts would be vs.st in proportion to tne am.cunt ot 
time, ettort and e..~pense involved in the planning. It lllllSt also be remembered, 
that only the absence ot a military mission, together with the pres~nce ot an 
important and pressing civil defense objective, juptities diverting military 
units !rom their combatant rolco Therefore, it is impossible ~o earmark m1litary 
units tor a specific civil defense role. Major e1em.ents ot the military W?-,~l 
always be re4uired tor purely m.ilita.ry operations. While civil defe~se B.Ad 
military defense a.re inseparably linked, eivil de:tense must, nevertheJ.ess, remat~ 
primarily a civilian responsibility. 
However, the~ is respo~sible for eoordL'1B.ting both the planning fo~ a~~ 
the rendering of :milita.ry support by all o'! the s~.rvic~s in civ,il det'enise 
emergencies. CON.ARC ha.a been given this mission through9ut the ZI. Cl,ose co­
ordination is e!tected with civ"i.l defense authorities at National, regional, 
State, a:nd local levels in planning tor support ot civil detense emer~ener 
operations. Tb.us, the military c:a.n minimize post-attack diversion qt ;mili~ 
resources tor emergency assistance to civil authorities by ~elping these ~ut~o~itien 
to increase civil defense readiness. General Lemnitzer bas said that the A:J:rmy 
will assist in ettorts to improve civil detense prepa.r~dness ~uring t4e pre-
attack period to the extent p~r:mitted by budgetary and other +~•ouree _ 
limitations and the requirement to maintain its army's combat reaQ.in~se. 
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In briet, military assistance in civil defense eme~gencies sha.11 be 
rendered when sueh assistance is r~quested or directed in aceorda.nce with 
appropriate Public laws and Executive Orders. '!he active and reserve componeµ,t~ 
or the services will be prepared to support the maintenance ot a:o.d.jor the r~­
establisbment ot law and order in areas critical to national survival, in the 
event civil control or leadership is destroyed or overwhel.-m.ed. Military 
assists.nee a:ndjor control will be withdrawn when civil control is re-estaoitshe~. 
Our reserve Civil A:C'tairs units can assist the ZI Armies in this civil 
defense role. They a.re fashioned to t'Unetion a.mid civilians in the crisis, 
eon:t'usion and danger ot eombat and are, therefore, ideall.y suited tor sueh a 
mission. They a.re organized to o!ter assistance and advice in the eonduet of 
the essentiaJ. gover:mnental tunetions at all levels or govermnent. They are 
trained to cope with m:il.ita.ry-civilia.n relationships under the most extreme 
circumsta.nees. In tact, during eonibat operations part o~ their responsibility 
entails the aetual advice or supervision, where required, ot local ~iv:U dete~~,. 
Tb.e pertinent question tor us is--what is the task o~ Civil Mtairs and 
particul.a.rl.y the Civil At'ta.irs Resel"Ve units in the D'l..i11'Gary role in our 
domestic CiviJ. Da:f'ei1se? I belieYe we b.a;'t'e the answer. It is the same sort 
ot Civil Affairs support that we envisage tor 1-Jl!'..its in e01llbat. '.lhe Reserve 
Civil Mtairs units can provi~~ valuable assist~nee to eomm.anders--partieul.ar,ly 
in the prepa.ra;tion o'!: plans tor military assista.'.l'lce i:n. th~ pre-attaek phase. 
As you know this type ot a$eista.nce is being rendered ~.J.rea~ in some a:rm:;, 
areas. Civil A:r:fairs units in the Seeond. Army Area have been assigned. planµ:f,ng 
missions covering some thirteen. target complexes. First Ar1r>.y is tollowing 1::~ 
same proee&l.lre. I feel that we ahould make tull use ot the not inconsiderable 
talents o-r our Civil A:f'tairs units in all co:ntinentaJ. a:rm:y areas. Thi~ sort Qt 
utilization provides exeellent and purpos~ful training for the Civil Attair~ 
u.~its as well as valuable assistanes to the ZI A:;i:'l.rzy' e~nde~s. 
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It is not necessary to dwell on the assista:."1.ee Civil Aftairs units can 
render if' eaJ.led upon in the wake ot a thermonuclear attack on the United State~ • . 
It is clea.r that, in the i~itial. phases, our na.tio,:,a,1 recovery et:fort ot 
necessity would be decentral.ized. Any local omma.nd~r required to assist in 
the recovery o~ his neighboring co.nmunity woul.d hand.le his vital responsibility 
tor the milita:ry-~ivilian relations more cXfectively and more rapidly if he co\l'.J,d 
employ a trained Civil Affairs u-:iit to assist him. Should the commander be 
f'aeed with the temporary assumption of civilian eoiutrol in the absence o! lo~a;L 
authority he would have an even g:reater 1need. tor such a. wait. Tb.us, reserve 
Civil A.f'fairs units should be required to pertorm a two-told mission in support 
ot civil de~ens~ oparations; pre-pls.!L.~ing to imp:ro~e readiness to weathef a.~ 
atomic attack, a..vad :post~attaek operations. Reallstie pre-attack plamling a.p.q. 
well-eonceived. post~a.ttack tra.i:ui:ng will eontribute di:i:·ectly to National 
; 
Security. It will also eon:trib-u.te by im.provirig nation.al. co:n.fidenee. Cont'ide~~e 
derived. trom the k:-.iowledge that the .krmy is ready.11 able a,n.d wil~i.ng to h~lp. 
Con:.f'idence in the ability o'f t::us netion to· su:rviv-~ and prevail even again.st~ 
thermonuclear d.isaste~o 
To reeapitul.ate. In the atomic world Civil At'fe.irs a,eisurues a critical. role 
in military operations. With the broadening 8.li'.ti de,:ipani!lg of the battle zone 
to include whol® nations m.i.lita.!'y~e::ivil matters have become more ..::omplex and 
greater in magnitua.e tha:J. ar:.y e:..'q;)e:t·iene~d. b~reto:rort?. Tht'Jir pla.n.ini:ng.11 direetiR~, 
and ~oordination demands a state ot reaQ'dn~ss, a capability to rea.t without 
pa.raJ.lel. in history o This eonru.·Gion of readineH:!16 d.e:mB.ll!ds a Civil Att'airs 
capabil1ty extending from the :t1.ationaJ. level through ea.ch t:OOllIJBJ!td eehelo:0- do~ t .o 
the Battle Group. Civil Atll."ai.rs is au i·,. esc:apa.ble a:'.:d in.iereasingly impo:rtant 
f'unction of comma.r.d tba.t requires ctlr~etion, eoordi:natio~ and control at the 
General Stat't' le,rel. 
A year or so ago, based on General Bruce Clarke's reeomme~~tion, the ter'JII. 
"Military Government" was dropped tro:m the title ot this tunetipn. This was a, 
measure ot prime importance. It is a long step towards correcting the !allaeioue 
and dangerous thinking which erroneously designates Civii .Affairs as an 
accompaniment solely of the occupation of conquered territory. Time moves on, 
gentlemen; let us move with it; let us once and tor all dispel t:tw concept tll,a.t 
Civil Affairs operations commence after eont'liet has ended; let us eliminate ~hf;t 
reactionary thinking that blinds many ot our people to the major contribution 
that Civil Affairs can and must :make to our suee~ss in war, hot or cold. We im+st 
instill the doctrine that commanders require a General St~t toeal point !Qr 
coordinating all matters of the military-civilian relationship. 1£:t us reflect 
well on the tact that the A:rm:y is the executive agency to~ the J)epart~ent of 
Defense in Civil Aftairs. 
'lbe Army canno~ withdraw into its training shell, eo~qerned only with 
developing weapons and tactical readiness for its next battlefield. '!here is 
more to war than. hardware a.nd tactics. War is a struggle for co:o.trol ot peoplef 
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Other services primarily eonduct their operations in the air a.n,d on SJ2d under th~- . . 
sea. The Army operates on the land and among the people. This is the army'$. 
environment, which it must :m...~ster as completely as the sailor niasters these~ 
and the flyer the air. 
Civil Affairs is moving ahead on ma~l fronts. Trends clepa.rt fro~ tra<li~i~~ 
concepts. Commanders and sta.tt officers ot the future must have an open mind., 
They must have vision, imagination, and daring. They must meet the c~e al'.l,!i 
adju$t to the challenge. They must master their enviropm.ent. !J.'h.is, I believe 
you, as future commanders and staff officers, will do. 
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SLIDE 1 
CIVIL AFFAIRS P'UNC'r.CONS 
l - LEGAL 
2 - PUBLIC SAFETY 
3 - PUBLIC HEALTH 
4 - PUBLIC WELFARE 
5 - PUBLIC FINANCE 
6 - PUBLIC EDUCATION 
7 - LABOR 
8 - ECONOMICS 
9 - COMMERCE & INDUSTRX 
lO - FOOD & AGRICUL'iURE 
11 - PRICE CONTROL & RA'f.IONING 
12 - PROPERTY CONTROL 
13 - CIVILIAN SUPPL".( 
14 - PUBLIC WORKS & UTIL:C'l'IES 
15 - PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS 
16 - PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
17 - CIVIL INFORMATION 
18 - DISPLACED PERSONS 
19 - ARTS, MONUMENTS & ARCHIVES 
SLIDE 2 
I}Il?OR~'l'I CI;VJ;L .A,FAIRS FIJ)}LDS 
' ' 
l - DISPLA,CED PERSONS 
2 - LABOR 
3 - PUBLIC SAFETY 
4 - POBLJ;C HE.ALT!! 
